

AGENDA
for
10 June 1980 Meeting with SecDef/DepSecDef

Following your Memorandum for the Record of the last (19 May) meeting are tabs with topics for discussion this week.

<u>TAB</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	
A	<i>covered</i>	General Items
B	<i>covered</i>	NIE 11-3/8-80
C	<i>covered</i>	 25X1
D	<i>covered</i>	 25X6
E	<i>covered/ memo delivered</i>	Refurbishment of SA-6
F	<i>covered</i>	 (There will be an SCC on Thursday, 12 June) 25X5
G	<i>covered</i>	Coordinating NFIP Appeal
H	<i>covered</i>	 meeting with SecDef/CJCS
I	<i>not covered</i>	NRO program for DoD - Brown memo (You talked with and Hermann re this last Friday) 25X1A

25X6

Additional items covered (See MemRec)

- Support from DoD on Cuban refugees
- Covert action

ROUTING

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	PB/NSC		
2			
3			
4			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE

ES

CONTROL NO.

25X1A

cy # 9

Handle Via

25X1A

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:



Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**TOP SECRET**

(Security Classification)

TOP SECRET

25X1

11 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense,
10 June 1980

1. The Secretary raised the question of my memo on support from DoD on Cuban refugees. I mistakenly took this one out of the notebook and wasn't fully up to speed. What I didn't know was whether that memo asking for more help from DoD [redacted]

[redacted] On top of that, I couldn't quite pin down what the Secretary wanted. He was basically supportive and enthusiastic about getting all we could from the refugees but seemed to want to know more specifically what type and number of people we needed from DoD. In the long run, he suggested that we could work this out with DIA. Sorry. [redacted]

2. We talked about the budget at some length. I indicated that we agreed on [redacted] that he and I were the two who read most on [redacted] that we agreed on [redacted] but that he put [redacted] right after [redacted] We went through the [redacted] discussion. He did agree that the [redacted] [redacted] were separate from the restoration of the delivery schedule and should be looked at carefully and separately. We agreed that it was a somewhat academic issue at this point since it is not an issue before the authorization conference. We agreed that it should not be our position to urge a breaking of the President's budget request; but it is clearly the DoD position that if, in the appropriation process, the Congress takes some other money out and we can urge the restoration of some of it for [redacted] they would like to do so. I believe we should go in with a letter for the authorization conference demurring on [redacted] and pointing out that the [redacted] portions of it have large out-year funding costs which have not been fully defined and which make it questionable as to whether these are supportable. [redacted]

Copy No. 7

Orig Cl By [redacted]
Rvw 11 June 2000

3. I'd like an update on the DIA building and what happened to it in the last couple of days. The DIA building did not come up in the conversation. [redacted]

4. We had a discussion on [redacted] Since his support for the acceleration of [redacted] was based on gaining votes for ratification of SALT, he feels that it can be dropped in priority now. I made the argument of the non-ICBM collection capability of [redacted] and the desire to get it as early as possible. [redacted]

5. The Secretary raised the issue of covert action. He had recently

[redacted]

The Secretary wants to know if we have all the support we need for covert actions that could lead to such capabilities. I indicated I thought things were moving adequately, but we needed to understand that it took long lead times to develop a covert action infrastructure

[redacted]

I see him on the 22nd of June. I suggest that OGC and DDO get in touch with Carl Smith and, in turn, directly in touch with whoever works on this in DoD so we get our signals together as quickly as possible. Over and above my meeting with [] I am increasingly anxious on two fronts:

7. I discussed NIE 11-3/8 with the Secretary. He agreed that we needed to look at a series of Soviet no-SALT cases and, with them, corresponding US no-SALT cases; he agreed to work with us on this. I suggested we have our people work together first to lay out the Soviet no-SALT cases that are worthy of exploration and then to ask Defense on their own to develop the corresponding US no-SALT forces. Secretary Brown still, of course, has hangups on what we should present in the NIE with regard to the US no-SALT forces but he does acknowledge that we need to develop both sets of no-SALT forces.

I'm a little concerned from the tone of Dave and Bruce's memo at the speed to get the NIE out and at the implication that a clear decision has been made as to what form the NIE will take this year. When I get back from my trip I would very much like to sit down with Dave and Bruce and go over the question of a hierarchy of volumes of an NIE 11-3/8 and, in particular, the definition of a series of questions that would be of Presidential interest and would be answered separately from the bulk of the material that is primarily of analyst and planner interest.


I'm not quite as anxious to try to hit early in November as Dave's memo indicates. Among other things, I don't think we want to have all the heat that can be generated by the final phases of NIE 11-3/8 in early November. A lot of heat leads to a lot of leaks. In addition, I hope to be out of the country the last two or three weeks of October. I have my eye more on mid-December as a likely date for producing the NIE.

[]

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

25X6



11. I told the Secretary we were adding an annex to NIE 11-3/8-80 on the productive capacity for nuclear warheads. He wanted to be sure this included their ability to produce and not just the availability of the necessary materials. I assured him it would. [REDACTED]


25X1

12. I raised the SA-6 problem and delivered our memo. The Secretary indicated irritation that this one had slipped through and that the money had not been set aside as promised. He directed [REDACTED] to get on it. Carl indicated they were working on it and thought it was going to be solved. [REDACTED]


25X1A

25X1

25X5



25X1A



25X1A

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X6
25X6
25X6

14. I talked about [redacted] SecDef said that Dave Jones had seen [redacted] but although he had heard about [redacted] maybe coming to see him he didn't know of anything going on that. I told him we'd like to keep in touch if he did. He said he'd let us know and keep us informed. [redacted]

25X1

25X1A

[redacted]
STANFIELD TURNER
Director

25X1A

25X1A

25X1

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

PB/NSC

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI	6,13	X		
3	DD/RM	2,3	4		
4	DD/NFA	7,11	2,3,4,8,9,10,13		
5	DD/CT		1,2,3,4,8,9,10		
6	DD/A		3		
7	DD/O	5,6,	1,8,9,10,12,14		
8	DD/S&T		2,4		
9	GC		6		
10	LC		2		
11	IG				
12	Compt		2		
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	PB/NSC		X		
19	C/CAS/DDO		5		
20	C/NE/DDO		6,8,9,10,12,14		
21	SA/DCI		10		
22	ES		X		
SUSPENSE DATE:					

25X1A

Remarks: Paragraphs extracted for action or info as indicated above.

To 9: Please consult C/NE on para 6.

Item 2/3: Passed by phone to RMS.

Item 6: Passed by phone to C/NE.

Item 13: Shown to

25X

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X6

7. He asked if we have anything more on the location of the hostages. I said no. [REDACTED]

25X6

8. I went through the briefing I had given the President on Soviet attitudes towards military balance. Harold, I believe, thought it was generally good. He recognized the sensitive charts of comparative tank and aircraft capabilities. On the most controversial chart in the strategic section on the number of warheads the Soviets might procure by 1989, it was suggested we needed to take another look at the question of warhead productive capability. He did not doubt that they could find the fissionable material if they needed it. He wondered, however, if they didn't start now whether they could generate a big enough industrial effort to produce such large numbers of warheads by 1989. [REDACTED]

25X1A

10. He did not raise the [REDACTED] issue, and I did not either. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X5

11. We talked about Graham Claytor's statement in his forthcoming testimony before the HPSCI on the rescue operation. [REDACTED]

25X1

12. I delivered Rae Huffstutler's memo on Soviet use of military forces as a pressure tactic. [REDACTED]

25X1

13. I didn't discuss the U.S. [REDACTED] Leave it in. [REDACTED]

25X6

14. I didn't discuss the Cuban issue. Leave it in. [REDACTED]

25X1

15. I didn't discuss COMSEC equipments. I think we can drop that until it comes to the fore again. [REDACTED]

25X1

16. I didn't raise the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program. I will wait for discussions with Hermann and Zeke. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1A

[REDACTED]
STANFIELD TURNER
Director

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

NO.		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI	4c	X		
3	DD/RM		5		
4	DD/NFA	4d	1,2,4,7,8,12		
5	DD/CT		4,16		
6	DD/A		9		
7	DD/O		1,2,3,4,6,7,9		
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC		9		
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt.				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EE0				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	PB/NSC		X		
19	NIO/WE		1		
20	NIO/SP	8			
21	ES		X		
22					
SUSPENSE DATE:					

Remarks: Paragraphs extracted for action or info as indicated above.

Executive Secretary

21 May 80

Date

3637 (4-78)